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Abstract 
This paper examines Australia’s national security interests in the South China Sea. It notes that a number 
of states lay claim to various islands in the region, and that territorial disputes over those claims have 
occasionally erupted into armed conflict in the past. The paper contends that China’s more recent 
behaviour in asserting its claim is unsettling the region and heightening strategic competition between 
China and the US, particularly regarding freedom of navigation through the South China Sea. 
The paper explores two key interests: first, the maintenance of a rules-based international order, 
especially in a contested and strategically-located area so close to Australia’s diplomatic, economic and 
military interests; and second, in ensuring continued and free access to the ‘global commons’. It concludes 
that Australia has real and tangible national security interests in the South China Sea that will become 
increasingly significant across the next decade, not least because Australia’s interests are closely aligned 
with those of the US, which potentially could involve aiding the US in the event of conflict. 
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What are Australia’s National Security Interests in the South China 
Sea? 1 
 
Introduction 
Australia’s 2013 Defence White Paper states that ‘Southeast Asia is located in a geo-strategically central 
position between the Pacific and Indian Oceans’ and that ‘[i]t acts as the conduit for the intensifying 
exchange of goods, people and ideas between East, South and West Asia’.2 Along similar lines, Robert 
Kaplan contends that ‘[t]he South China Sea functions as the throat of the Western Pacific and Indian 
Oceans—the mass of connective economic tissue where global sea routes coalesce’.3 Notably, the South 
China Sea is also of vital economic importance to Australia because 54 per cent of its trade passes through 
the region to the markets of Northeast Asia.4 
The South China Sea is, however, also host to a strategic competition and a range of territorial disputes 
that have occasionally erupted into armed conflict in the relatively-recent past. Rory Medcalf and James 
Brown have argued recently that ‘the chance of a near-war maritime security crisis in the disputed waters 
of … the South China Sea may be more likely in the next few years than in subsequent years’.5 This region 
will, therefore, be of elevated national security importance to Australia over the coming decade because 
of this increasing risk of conflict. 
This paper argues that Australia has real and tangible national security interests in the South China Sea 
that will become increasingly significant across the next decade. It explores two key interests: first, the 
maintenance of a rules-based international order, especially in a contested and strategically-located area 
so close to Australia’s diplomatic, economic and military interests; and second, in ensuring continued and 
free access to the ‘global commons’. The paper will also contend that because these two key Australian 
interests in the South China Sea disputes are also aligned with the global security interests of the US, 
there is a strong link to the Australia-US alliance commitment—with all its implications, including 
potentially aiding the US in the event of conflict. 
Why is Australia interested in the South China Sea? 
The South China Sea is the fulcrum of Southeast Asia. Excluding Taiwan, Pratas Island and Hainan Island 
in its north, the South China Sea includes three main geographic groups—the Paracel Islands, the Spratly 
Islands and Scarborough Reef—comprising only 13 square kilometres of land.6 China, Taiwan, Vietnam, 
The Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia and Indonesia each lay claim to some or all of the islands in the South 
China Sea, although many of these claims overlap and all are vigorously disputed.   
Michael Wesley notes that ‘[t]he conventional view is that the South China Sea disputes involve and are 
driven by three factors: overlapping territorial claims; rivalry over what may be significant hydrocarbon 
resources in the sea bed; and rivalry over considerable fisheries of the sea’.7 However, Wesley also notes 
that ‘there are at least four broader drivers of the conflict that make it unpredictable and extremely 
difficult to resolve through rational negotiation among the parties’.8 These broad drivers, which attract 
most interest by Australia, include that: 
[T]he disputes are a direct manifestation of Asia’s changing power topography [occasioned by the rise of 
China]; the disputes reflect the growing anxiety of China about its dependence on external lines of 
supply; the disputes also bring the United States and China into direct opposition in terms of their 
deepening rivalry; [and] the tendency [in Asia] to see rules and institutions as subordinate to the needs 
and prerogatives of the state.9   
Australia’s 2013 National Security Strategy states that ‘Australia’s region is home to several major 
powers, but our major ally the United States and our major trading partner China will have the greatest 
influence on the region’.10 It also asserts that ‘the United States-China relationship will be the single most 
influential force in shaping the strategic environment’.11 The strategic location and importance of the 
South China Sea suggest that is where the interests of China and the US will increasingly intersect. 
Additionally, because of competing and often overlapping territorial claims by nearly all the littoral states 
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of the South China Sea, the region is rife with territorial disputes that have occasionally erupted into 
short, nasty skirmishes at sea.  
Australia’s national security interests in the South China Sea are best summed up by the 2013 Defence 
White Paper, which states: 
Australia has interests in the peaceful resolution of territorial and maritime disputes including in the 
South China Sea in accordance with international law, the prevention of aggression within Southeast 
Asia, and freedom of navigation and maritime security in the region’s sea lanes.12   
A rules-based international order 
A rules-based international order is where states recognise common interests and values, are bound by 
international law, respect each other’s sovereignty, honour their agreements, and accept limitations in 
making and conducting war.13 Anthony Bergin and David Lang recently argued that ‘[t]he rule of law is an 
essential condition if cooperation and orderly behaviour are to be advanced in the Asia-Pacific. We need 
norms and rules that guide—and govern—relations among regional states’.14 For its part, Australia has 
made clear that any disputes—but particularly those in the South China Sea—should be resolved 
peacefully and in accordance with international law.15  
All of the territorial claims in the South China Sea extend seawards to 12 nautical miles (nm) in relation to 
territorial waters and 200 nm for exclusive economic zones (EEZ). Most of these claims are based on the 
provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).16 Of note, while China 
and Australia have ratified UNCLOS, the US has not—although it adheres to its provisions in practice.17 
Despite China’s ratification of UNCLOS, the Chinese claim, most recently articulated to the UN in 2009 but 
extending back to the 15th century, is by far the most extensive and provocative, being ‘more than a 
thousand miles from the Chinese mainland’,18 and seemingly ‘based on surveying expeditions, fishing 
activities, and naval patrols’.19 It is often referred to as the ‘nine dash line’ claim, as it comprises ‘nine 
dashes that encircle islands, waters, and other features of the South China Sea … encompass[ing] 
approximately 2,000,000 square kilometres of maritime space’.20 
It is unclear whether China claims the entire area and all that is within the nine dashes, or just the 
landmasses and their associated territorial waters and EEZs under the provisions of UNCLOS. China 
asserts that it has ‘indisputable sovereignty over the South China Sea and the island[s]’.21 However, its 
claim is disputed by other claimants, not least because its ‘nine-dash-line’ overlaps the claims of others.  
Also, UNCLOS ‘compels states to surrender the majority of their historical maritime claims in favour of the 
maritime zones awarded under the convention’, which China has not done.22   
Over the past several decades, territorial disputes in the South China Sea have occasioned bullying and 
even bloodshed. China used force in 1974 when it ‘ejected South Vietnam from the western Paracel 
Islands’, while between 1979 and 1982 there were numerous small clashes between China and Vietnam 
in the Spratly Islands.23 In 1988, another clash in the Spratly Islands occurred when the Chinese Navy 
destroyed three Vietnamese vessels, resulting in 73 deaths.24   
In 1995, The Philippines discovered that China had occupied Mischief Reef, in an area claimed by it.25  In 
more recent years, China has undertaken a substantial land reclamation program on several islands.26 It 
has also fortified a number of islands already in its possession, and significantly increased its naval and 
para-military patrols in the South China Sea. China’s seemingly increased readiness to employ military 
force to assert its claims in the South China Sea has unsettled its neighbours and been a source of 
continuing instability in the region. 
While Australia does not take a position on the competing claims, it ‘continue[s] to encourage the parties 
to clarify and pursue their claims and maritime rights in accordance with international law’.27 Michael 
Wesley goes further and argues that Australia, as a medium-level power, ‘benefits from the ascendancy, 
vitality and continuing evolution of a rational, egalitarian, rules-based international order’.28 It seems 
evident, however, that China is less interested in a rules-based order, subordinating the rules and 
institutions of the international order to its own needs and desires,29 which impacts the concept of ‘the 
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global commons’ and the strategic interests of Australia and the US in ensuring they remain free and 
open.   
The global commons 
The global commons are ‘those areas of the world beyond the control of any one state—sea, space, air, 
and cyberspace—that constitute the fabric … of the international system’.30 The US takes access to the 
global commons very seriously, not least because the sea or maritime commons are intrinsically linked to 
US naval supremacy, allowing the US Navy to project global power from international waters. As 
explained by Tara Murphy: 
In today’s global community, a state cannot consider its security solely a function of the areas directly 
surrounding it; rather, the security of one is tightly linked to the security of all. National defense is not 
ensured only through maintaining the sanctity of one’s borders, but is also highly dependent upon the 
ability to navigate safely through the global commons. These commons … enable militaries to protect 
national territory and interests, as well as facilitate the passage of goods, people, communications, and 
data upon which every member of the international community depends.31  
It is the maritime commons that are most impacted by the ongoing disputes in the South China Sea. In 
accordance with UNCLOS, only the territorial sea claims out to 12 nm from their baselines are territorial 
waters. Theoretically, therefore, everything else is ‘common’, wherein all vessels have right of free 
passage. However, because of the ‘nine dash line’, and the multitude of overlapping 12nm territorial seas, 
there is not much unclaimed space left in the region. Additionally, China requires states to ‘first obtain 
permission … before transiting its EEZ’, which is in contradiction of the provisions of UNCLOS.32 As 
Murphy argues: 
China’s assertion of exclusionary rights in its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) … heighten suspicion of 
Chinese intentions in the region. If other states follow suit to prevent safe, unrestricted passage of sea 
vessels through their EEZ … the openness of the commons is directly challenged and could have 
devastating economic results.33 
Needless to say, Australia and the US do not recognise China’s assertion. Nor do they limit their 
application of the freedom of navigation as they continue to sail warships through ‘contested’ areas as an 
expression of their will. As a result, there have been several incidents where Chinese forces have 
challenged US forces operating in the global commons.  
In March 2009, US Naval Ship Impeccable, an intelligence collection vessel, was operating 140 kilometres 
from Hainan Island when it was harassed by a combination of Chinese naval, para-military and fishing 
vessels, forcing it to leave the area.34 In December 2013, another incident occurred in international 
waters in the South China Sea between USS Cowpens, a guided missile cruiser, and the Chinese Navy’s sole 
aircraft carrier battle group.35 Both incidents serve to underscore the tensions evident in the region, the 
differing US and Chinese understandings of international law, and the seriousness of the US in 
maintaining its unhindered access to the global commons.   
Wesley argues that ‘[a]s a small, relatively isolated, heavily trade-dependent country, Australia would be 
more affected than most nations by sustained competition over control of the global and regional 
commons’.36 It is not surprising, therefore, that the 2013 Defence White Paper asserts that ‘Australia has 
interests in the … freedom of navigation and maritime security in the region’s sea lanes’.37 This is 
significant because Australia clearly benefits from US maintenance of the commons and its exercising of 
freedom of navigation. But it is also important because of its potential to bring Australia into conflict with 
China because of its alliance with the US. 
The Australia-US alliance 
The 2013 National Security Strategy states that ‘[t]he Australia-United States alliance … remains our most 
important security relationship’.38 The relationship is based on ANZUS, the 1951 security treaty between 
Australia, New Zealand and the US, which requires the parties to ‘consult together whenever in the 
opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the parties is 
threatened in the Pacific’.39  
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Some would argue that the wording of ANZUS is deliberately ambiguous. But so is Australia’s policy 
position on whether ANZUS would be triggered if the US chose to go to war with China over Taiwan, or 
conflict in the East China Sea or South China Sea.40 Several Australian ministers have stated in the past 
that ANZUS would ‘not necessarily apply in the case of a Taiwan contingency’ or if ‘the US had sent forces 
to support its Japanese ally in a confrontation with China over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands’.41  
However, the contemporary relevance of the ANZUS agreement is not about whether one party would be 
drawn into a conflict involving another; ‘it involves a great deal more’.42 The Australia-US relationship is 
also based on intelligence and technology sharing, as well as the maintenance of common values and 
traditions, which includes the desirability of a rules-based international order and the sanctity of the 
global commons.43 Therefore, in many ways, ANZUS is no longer simply about what is says but what it 
stands for as a symbol of unity and resolve in maintaining regional stability.  
Nevertheless, on the specific question of Australia being drawn into conflict, Nick Bisley and Brendan 
Taylor have argued that:  
[A]n East China Sea [or South China Sea] conflict is very unlikely to lead to an automatic invocation of 
ANZUS. But because of the strong links established between Washington and Canberra in recent years, as 
well as the expanded strategic purpose of the alliance, if America expects Australian involvement then it 
will be very difficult to remain on the sidelines.44  
Wesley similarly argues that ‘[w]ere Washington to become embroiled in a conflict in the South China Sea, 
it is highly likely that Australia would be expected to fulfil its alliance obligations alongside US forces’.45  
Any conflict between the US and China is likely to be the result of a failure in the inter-related concepts 
and requirements of a rules-based international order and unhindered access to the global commons. The 
incidents involving the Impeccable and Cowpens are examples which could easily have escalated into 
conflict, with significant ramifications for Australia. Astutely, Medcalf and Brown assess that: 
Any potential Australian involvement in a conflict with China would most likely come about through a 
request from the United States. It is difficult to imagine that the Australia-US alliance would avoid 
fundamental damage were Australia to refuse to support America in a military conflict or confrontation 
with China.46 
Conclusion 
Two of Australia’s national security interests in the South China Sea are the maintenance of a rules-based 
international order and continued and free access to the global commons. As Medcalf and Brown remind 
us: 
Australia benefits from exceptional interconnectedness with the world, through flows of trade, finance, 
information and people. This brings with it a reliance on rules, order, and secure access to the global 
commons.47   
The South China Sea epitomises this ‘inter-connectedness’, particularly in the context of major strategic 
competition between a rising China and the US, with the potential also to involve one or more of the 
Southeast Asian claimant states, as well as Taiwan. This competition, which seems unlikely to be resolved 
in the near term, will ensure the region will continue to remain significant to Australia.   
The disputes remind us of Thucydides’ assertion that ‘the strong do what they can and the weak suffer 
what they must’.48 Kaplan argues that this is indeed China’s ‘undeclared strategy’ and that it is using a 
range of diplomatic, economic and military levers to strengthen its position in the region against the other 
claimants.49 The issue for Australia is that China’s assertiveness may cross a ‘red line’ in terms of the 
strategic interests of the US, with profound implications for the Australia-US alliance—and for regional 
stability—if hostilities were to breakout in the South China Sea. It clearly is in the interests of all parties to 
ensure they do not. 
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